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for Settlement: Due Process and the
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Act
Kyle Semroc*
ABSTRACT
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act (PFAA) em-
powers victims of domestic violence to obtain protection orders
through a hearing process.  Once the Protection from Abuse
(PFA) process is initiated, a statewide registry system automati-
cally generates a civil record.  Currently, no statutory language
governing the expungement of a PFA record exists in Penn-
sylvania, and courts have decided that a right to expungement
exists only in limited circumstances.  The courts are silent, how-
ever, on whether a protection order by consent of the parties
with no admission of abuse is available for expungement.
This Comment begins by describing the procedure by which
a plaintiff files for a protection order and discusses the due pro-
cess protections embedded within each step of the process.  Ex-
pungement in the criminal context provides a contrast to the civil
context in the subsequent section.  Next, this Comment discusses
case law related to the expungement of civil records in the PFA
context.  Finally, an analysis of relevant PFA case law reveals
that a protection order by consent with no admission of abuse
likely cannot be expunged from a defendant’s civil record.
The purpose of the PFAA is to stop current abuse and pre-
vent instances of further abuse.  If a consent order could be ex-
punged from a civil record, a defendant may be significantly
more willing to agree to such an order and, thus, the court would
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be able to serve the best interests of the victims of domestic
abuse.
Therefore, a PFA attorney should be able to efficiently and
effectively settle a PFA matter before the dispute ever reaches
the final hearing; the potential for expungement would provide a
PFA attorney with a powerful tool for settlement and, thus, the
Pennsylvania Legislature should amend the PFAA to include an
expungement provision.  Because expungement is presently not
available for consent orders, this Comment proposes amending
the PFAA and two additional alternatives to circumvent the pro-
hibition on expungement.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 R
II. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 R
A. The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act . . . . . 942 R
1. PFA Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 R
2. PFA Hearing Process and Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 R
3. Purpose of the PFAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 R
B. Expungement Law in the Criminal Realm . . . . . . . . . 948 R
1. Basis for Criminal Record Expungement . . . . . . 948 R
2. Wexler Balancing Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 R
C. Expungement Law in the Civil Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 R
III. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 R
A. PFA Record Expungement Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 R
1. Carlacci v. Mazaleski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 R
2. Commonwealth v. Charnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 R
3. Commonwealth v. Nelson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 R
B. PFA Record Expungement Due Process Analysis . 957 R
1. PFA Case Precedent Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 R
2. Public Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 R
C. Three Proposed Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 R
1. Grant Defendant a Wexler Hearing as Part of
the Consent Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 R
2. Reschedule the Final Hearing to Create a
Cooling-Off Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 R
3. Amend the PFAA to Allow Expungement of
Consent Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 R
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 3  9-JUL-18 14:44
2018] PENNSYLVANIA PROTECTION FROM ABUSE ACT 941
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act (PFAA)1 does
not contain a provision related to the expungement of Protection
from Abuse (PFA) records.  Courts in Pennsylvania have held that
a limited right to expunge a PFA record exists as “an adjunct of due
process.”2  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has yet to
decide whether a final order3 by consent4 of the parties granting the
plaintiff’s petition for protection from abuse5 can be expunged from
a defendant’s civil record.
This lack of guidance poses a problem for parties seeking to
settle PFA matters prior to the final hearing in the form of a con-
sent order.6  If clear guidelines related to the expungement of con-
sent orders existed, then attorneys could use the availability of
expungement as a bargaining tool during settlement negotiations
for consent orders.7  The opportunity for expungement may create
the incentive for a defendant to agree to a more favorable consent
order for the plaintiff and bring about a cessation of abuse.
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of the
PFAA, synthesize Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court deci-
sions related to the expungement of civil records, and provide solu-
tions to the lack of statutory expungement guidelines for PFA
orders.  The inquiry of this Comment is limited to PFA matters in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and those civil records that are
archived by the Protection from Abuse Database (PFAD) system.8
1. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101 (2017).
2. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 2002).
3. See PA. R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (“A final order is any order that disposes of all
claims and of all parties.”). See also 20 WEST’S PA. PRAC., APPELLATE PRACTICE
§ 341:3.1.1L (“An order granting a petition for protection from abuse and dispos-
ing of all claims raised in the petition is final under Pa. R.A.P. 341(b), notwith-
standing that other matters, such as a child custody dispute, may be ongoing
between the parties.”).
4. See PA. R. PHILA. CO. FAMILY DIV. 1901.11(a) (“The parties may agree to
the entry of a final order by consent.”).
5. § 6106(a) (“An adult or an emancipated minor may seek relief under this
chapter . . . by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant.”).
6. § 6108(a) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve any con-
sent agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor chil-
dren.”).  This Comment uses “consent agreement,” “final order by consent,” and
“consent order” interchangeably throughout. See infra Part II.A–IV.
7. Aaron Weems, Expungement of PFA Records an Important but Often
Overlooked Tool, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 6, 2016, 8:57 PM), http://
www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202756926860/Expungement-of-PFA-Records-
an-Important-but-Often-Overlooked-Tool.
8. § 6105(e) (“The Pennsylvania State Police shall establish a Statewide regis-
try of protection orders and shall maintain a complete and systematic record and
index of all valid temporary and final court orders of protection, court-approved
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Part II.A of this Comment discusses the nuances of the PFAA and
describes the hearing procedure9 in addition to illuminating the
purpose of the Act.10  Part II.B of this Comment outlines the way in
which courts handle record expungement in the criminal realm11 as
a contrast to expungement in the civil realm, as discussed in Part
II.C.12
Part III.A of this Comment summarizes the three crucial cases
related to PFA record expungement.13  Part III.B of this Comment
synthesizes the PFA record expungement cases to provide a likely
answer as to whether an order by consent with no admission of
abuse is available for expungement under current Pennsylvania law
and considers the public policy implications of PFA record ex-
pungement.14  Finally, Part III.C provides three proposed resolu-
tions to the lack of statutory authority and Pennsylvania Supreme
Court precedent for expungement of a consent agreement.15  This
Comment ultimately suggests that amendment of the PFAA to al-
low expungement in limited circumstances would coincide with the
purpose of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act
1. PFA Definitions
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act (PFAA) governs
acts of abuse committed by family or household members, sexual or
intimate partners, and persons who share biological parenthood.16
The purpose of the PFAA is to prevent the escalation of disputes
among those with “familial relationships” where injury is likely to
occur.17  If no requisite familial relationship as defined by the stat-
ute exists, then the plaintiff will not have standing to pursue a pro-
consent agreements and a foreign protection order filed pursuant to section
6104(d). . . .”).
9. § 6107 (outlining the procedure a plaintiff must follow to obtain a protec-
tion from abuse court order).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2017) (providing the method by which crimi-
nal defendants may expunge criminal history record information).
12. See infra Part II.B–C.
13. See Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d
728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2017).
17. See McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“The
entire thrust of the Protection from Abuse Act and rules of civil procedure is to
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tection order.18  A PFA petitioner is required to establish that
abuse has occurred by a preponderance of the evidence instead of
the criminal evidentiary burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.19  Cases exist in which the abusive events in question do not
rise to the level of criminal culpability, but the victim is still able to
file for a civil protection order.20  Five ways exist for a defendant
possessing a familial relationship with a plaintiff to commit abuse
and thus be subject to a protection order under the PFAA.21
The first type of abuse listed in the PFAA for which a plaintiff
may seek a protection order is physical abuse.22  Bruising and other
similar marks on an alleged victim can constitute evidence of bodily
injury.23  Instances of pushing, hitting, and choking a victim can in-
dicate that the defendant has inflicted or attempted to inflict some
form of bodily injury.24  The PFAA, however, does not require that
actual physical injury occur in order to meet the statutory definition
of abuse.25
The second type of abuse occurs when a defendant places a
plaintiff in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily harm.26  Past
instances of abuse can form the basis for current reasonable fear of
imminent serious bodily harm in the mind of the plaintiff.27  The
perpetrator of this type of abuse need not act with specific intent to
place a victim in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily harm.28
create an efficient, simple and rapid vehicle for the resolution of family disputes.”
(quoting Mahorsky v. Mahorsky, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 210, 213 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1982))).
18. See Slusser v. DeBoer, 985 A.2d 974, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (stating
that relationship through consanguinity is covered under Title 23, Section 6102 of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes in addition to familial relationship by law).
19. See Boykin v. Brown, 868 A.2d 1264, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
20. See Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (finding that appellant’s argument that his conduct did not rise to the level of
criminal culpability does not defeat the trial court’s protection from abuse order).
21. § 6102.
22. See § 6102(a) (stating that the first type of abuse is “attempting to cause
or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily in-
jury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual
assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a
deadly weapon”).
23. See B.T.W. ex rel. T.L. v. P.J.L., 956 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
24. See Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
25. See DeHaas ex rel. E.D. v. DeHaas, 708 A.2d 100, 102 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998).
26. § 6102(a)(2).
27. See Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)
(stating that “facts surrounding the prior PFA consent order are relevant to an
understanding as to the reasonableness of [petitioner’s] fear relative to the present
petition”).
28. See Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (stating that
husband’s entrance into wife’s half of duplex in the middle of the night, coupled
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Actual physical injury as a result of the abuse is not required.29  A
threat to kill, regardless of the existence of any actual or attempted
violence, is sufficient to meet the definition of abuse under this sec-
tion.30  The court may infer reasonable fear as a result of witness
testimony at a hearing.31
The infliction of false imprisonment, as defined by the Penn-
sylvania Crimes Code,32 is the third form of abuse detailed by the
PFAA.33  The act of restraining a victim is tied to the deprivation of
his or her liberty and thus the legislature considers this an act of
abuse.34
The fourth type of abuse occurs when the perpetrator physi-
cally or sexually abuses a minor child.35  This definition of abuse is
broader than that used in Child Protective Services Law36 and the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code.37
with past incidents of abuse by husband towards wife, were sufficient to establish
that wife reasonably feared serious bodily injury from husband).
29. See McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (find-
ing that defendant’s “verbal chiding, intimidating demeanor (blocking [plaintiff’s]
vehicular access), threat of retaliation, and striking of [plaintiff’s] vehicle to the
point of damaging it coalesce to constitute abusive behavior”).
30. See R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). See also Count-
erman v. Shoemaker, 14 Pa. D. & C.4th 217, 219 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1992), aff’d, 625
A.2d 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that plaintiff was placed in reasonable fear of
bodily injury when defendant called plaintiff’s phone, stated that he had a gun, and
threatened to kill plaintiff, her fiance´, and her family).
31. See Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 539 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (remarking
that “the court determines a witness’s credibility and may infer fear based on the
witness’s testimony describing the defendant’s actions”).
32. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2903 (2017).
33. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102(a)(3) (2017).
34. See Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  The court
stated:
[T]he appellant has admitted to restraining the appellee during two of the
incidents.  During one incident, he admitted restraining her for a period
of ten to fifteen minutes.  We believe there was sufficient evidence for the
court to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant
knowingly restrained the appellee so as to interfere substantially with her
liberty.
Id.
35. § 6102(a)(4).
36. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301—6385 (2017).
37. See Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995).  The court stated:
[F]or a remedy to be available under PFAA, it is not necessary that physi-
cal harm to a child be as serious as that which is required for a child to be
removed from his home and placed in protective custody.  Corporal pun-
ishment inflicted recklessly or in enraged manner may result in bodily
injury permitting issuance of protection order under PFAA.
Id.
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The final type of abuse under the PFAA deals with a course of
conduct that places a person in reasonable fear of bodily injury.38
Unlike the second type of abuse, although the acts and events indi-
vidually may not amount to abuse, the totality of the actions, when
viewed in relation to one another, can constitute abuse under this
provision.39  The reviewing court often looks to the timeline of
events that the petitioner experiences and assesses the reasonable-
ness of the petitioner’s fear at each stage.40  Once any one of these
alleged acts of abuse occurs, a prospective plaintiff may initiate the
PFA hearing process.41
2. PFA Hearing Process and Relief
To begin the PFA process, an adult or emancipated minor must
file a petition with the court in which he or she alleges that the
defendant has perpetrated some form of abuse.42  The plaintiff in a
PFA matter has the option to petition the court for an emergency
temporary protection order by alleging that the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s minor child is in immediate and present danger of
abuse.43  If the plaintiff seeks this emergency relief, the court must
conduct an ex parte proceeding and use a standard lower than a
preponderance of the evidence to evaluate the plaintiff’s claim.44  A
temporary order remains in effect until the court either modifies or
terminates the order or a plaintiff files a motion to withdraw the
temporary order.45
When a PFA plaintiff successfully petitions the court for either
emergency or non-emergency temporary relief, the court must hold
a hearing within ten business days, during which the plaintiff must
attempt to prove the allegations set forth in the complaint by a pre-
38. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102(a)(5) (2017).
39. See Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (re-
marking that, when determining whether abuse has occurred as a result of a course
of conduct, the court should consider the totality of the defendant’s actions).
40. See id. at 1023 (determining that “[w]ife established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that [h]usband engaged in a course of conduct that placed [w]ife in
reasonable fear of bodily injury”).
41. § 6107.
42. § 6106(a).
43. § 6107(b)(1).
44. Id. See also Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The
ex parte hearings conducted in order to secure a temporary PFA Order . . . require
only that the petitioner convince the court he or she is in ‘immediate and present
danger of abuse.’” (quoting § 6107(b)(1))).
45. § 6107(b)(2).
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ponderance of the evidence.46  Because of the mandatory duty to
hold a hearing, the court may grant the plaintiff or defendant a con-
tinuance in the event that the hearing cannot be held on the sched-
uled date.47  If the court grants an ex parte temporary order and
continues the proceedings, the temporary order remains in full ef-
fect until the court holds a final hearing.48  Even if the court does
not issue a temporary order after it continues and reschedules the
final hearing, the court may, subsequent to the first ex parte hearing
but prior to the final hearing, allow the plaintiff the opportunity to
present new evidence of abuse, at which time the court may issue
an ex parte temporary order “as it deems necessary.”49
For a final hearing to satisfy due process, the court must give
the plaintiff the chance to present witnesses, testify regarding his or
her version of the facts, and cross-examine the opposing party and
his or her witnesses.50  The court must also afford the defendant the
same opportunities as listed above.51  The plaintiff is not “rigor-
ously limited to the specific allegations” set forth in his or her peti-
tion and is free to present evidence of prior abuse not detailed in
the petition during the hearing.52  No right to court-appointed
counsel for either the plaintiff or the defendant exists during PFA
hearings; the court must merely advise the parties of their right to
obtain representation.53
As a result of a PFA hearing or settlement negotiation, the
court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agree-
ment to stop the current abuse and prevent the defendant from
abusing the plaintiff in the future.54  The court possesses broad
powers of relief and can issue a protection order to keep the defen-
dant away from the plaintiff,55 evict the defendant from a shared
46. § 6107(a). See also Drew, 870 A.2d at 378 (commenting on the use of
“shall” in Title 23, Section 6107(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes to
create a mandatory requirement for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing).
47. Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(citing § 6101) (stating that evidentiary hearings are mandatory and thus a continu-
ance may be granted by the court at the request of either party).
48. § 6107(b)(2) (“The order shall remain in effect until modified or termi-
nated by the court after notice and hearing.”).
49. See Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (citing
§ 6107(c)) (stating, “trial courts have discretion to continue evidentiary hearings
regarding final PFA orders and enter appropriate temporary ex parte orders to
cover the intervening time”).
50. See Lanza v. Simconis, 914 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
51. Id.
52. See Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
53. See Weir v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
54. § 6108(a).
55. § 6108(a)(1).
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residence,56 award temporary custody rights to the plaintiff if minor
children are involved,57 and order that the defendant relinquish any
weapons to the sheriff’s department.58  The court wields broad pow-
ers of relief to achieve its ultimate goal of preventing abuse.59
3. Purpose of the PFAA
The purpose of the PFAA is to protect victims of domestic vio-
lence from the perpetrators of physical and sexual abuse.60  The
PFAA seeks to protect a wide range of people from current and
future abuse, including spouses, household members, intimate part-
ners, and children.61  A court may suspend certain rights held by a
defendant, such as the right to possess firearms,62 in order to
achieve the court’s ultimate goal of abuse prevention.63  To achieve
this goal, courts often utilize an eviction proceeding tied to the tem-
porary protection from abuse order.64
The protections guaranteed by the PFAA are necessary due to
the turmoil arising from the breakdown of deep familial relation-
ships between husbands, wives, children, and other people in inti-
mate relationships.65  The Pennsylvania General Assembly, in
drafting the PFAA, recognized the practical need to temporarily
suspend the procedural due process rights of the defendant.66  The
drafters of the PFAA also recognized that this suspension could not
56. § 6108(a)(2).
57. § 6108(a)(4).
58. § 6108(a)(7).
59. See Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Ci-
polla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).
60. See Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
61. See Weir v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
62. § 6108 (a)(7) (detailing that a court may “[o]rder[ ] the defendant to tem-
porarily relinquish to the sheriff . . . the defendant’s firearms and prohibit[ ] the
defendant from acquiring or possessing any firearm for the duration of the order
and requir[e] the defendant to relinquish to the sheriff any firearm license”).
63. See Kelly v. Mueller, 861 A.2d 984, 993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), vacated, 912
A.2d 202 (Pa. 2006).
64. See McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“The
goal of the Protection from Abuse Act is protection and prevention of further
abuse by removing the perpetrator of the abuse from the household and/or from
the victim for a period of time.” (quoting Viruet v. Cancel, 727 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999))).
65. See Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
66. See Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“To meet the
special circumstances of abuse cases, the legislature fashioned procedures which
suspend, temporarily, the due process rights of the alleged abuser.” (quoting In Re
Penny R., 509 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986))).
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be without limit and must be subject to judicial restraint.67  When a
PFA matter is initiated, the PFAD system automatically generates a
record of the filings and proceedings.68  This Comment will discuss
the issues created by this automatic generation of civil records com-
bined with a lack of statutory authority for PFA expungement,69
but this Comment will first provide an overview of how expunge-
ment operates in the criminal context in order to illuminate a possi-
ble framework for how expungement could operate in the context
of a PFA.70
B. Expungement Law in the Criminal Realm
1. Basis for Criminal Record Expungement
Although statutory authority is the primary mechanism for
criminal record expungement,71 a criminal defendant, in certain
limited circumstances, has a due process right to petition for ex-
pungement of an arrest record that is not dependent upon statutory
authority.72  The Pennsylvania General Assembly has laid out
guidelines for when expungement of criminal records is appropri-
ate, including situations such as when no disposition has been re-
ceived by the court,73 when an individual subject to arrest
information has reached the age of 70 and has not been arrested or
prosecuted for at least ten years,74 and when the charged offense is
a summary offense and the individual seeking expungement has not
been arrested or prosecuted for at least five years following convic-
tion for that offense.75
An arrest record may place certain difficulties and hardships
on a defendant, and criminal record expungement is intended to
afford a defendant some form of due process protection against
67. See In Re Penny R., 509 A.2d at 340 (stating that “[c]ontinued suspension,
irrespective of motivating factors, cannot be countenanced without judicial limits,
subject to substantive or procedural restraint”).
68. § 6105(e)(3) (“The registry of the Pennsylvania State Police shall be avail-
able at all times to inform courts, dispatchers and law enforcement officers of any
valid protection order involving any defendant.”).
69. See infra Part II.C.1.
70. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2017).
71. “Expunge” is defined as, “to remove from a record, list, or book; to erase
or destroy.” Expunge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72. See Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Waughtel, 999 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)).
73. § 9122(a)(1).
74. § 9122(b)(1).
75. § 9122(b)(3).  Other situations justifying expungement include when an
individual has been dead for three years under Section 9122(b)(2) or when an indi-
vidual’s offense satisfies the conditions expressed in Section 9122(a)(2).
§§ 9122(b)(2), 9122(a)(2).
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these hardships.76  For example, information related to an arrest
may inflict substantial damage to an individual’s reputation.77  The
arrestee may additionally suffer economic losses that are direct and
serious.78  Even if an arrestee is acquitted of the charges involved,
the arrestee may be restricted from applying for or denied certain
opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses.79
Furthermore, police may utilize an arrest record as a factor to de-
termine whether to arrest an individual in a new criminal matter, or
whether to exercise discretion in a charging decision.80
2. Wexler Balancing Test
The expungement of a criminal record is an uphill battle for a
defendant because statutory authority typically governs criminal re-
cord expungement and is limited in scope and availability.81  When
a petitioner seeks the expungement of a criminal record, the court
can, under even more limited circumstances, grant a hearing in
which the court weighs factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Wex-
ler82 to determine whether expungement is appropriate.83  The de-
fendant in Wexler was arrested and charged with corruption of a
minor after police found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in his
minor daughter’s bedroom.84  The Commonwealth also filed crimi-
nal conspiracy charges against the juvenile’s mother.85
After the juvenile daughter entered a consent decree in juve-
nile court, the Commonwealth filed a petition for nolle prosequi86
of the charges against the juvenile’s parents.87  The court granted
the petition for nolle prosequi and the co-defendants subsequently
filed a petition to expunge the arrest records related to the afore-
mentioned incident.88  Following a hearing, the hearing judge
denied the petition to expunge the arrest records.89  The
76. See Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1269–70 (Pa. 2016). See
also Commonwealth v. Butler, 672 A.2d 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
77. See Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 587–88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)
(quoting Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. § 9122.
82. Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 878.
85. Id. at 879.
86. “Nolle prosequi” is defined as “a legal notice that a lawsuit or prosecution
has been abandoned.” Nolle Prosequi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
87. Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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co-defendants appealed and the Pennsylvania Superior Court af-
firmed the denial of the petition.90  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed and held that the petition to expunge the arrest
records should have been granted.91
If a court decides that expungement may be appropriate, then
the court must compare the detriment to the benefit resulting from
the existence of the defendant’s criminal record.92  The court ulti-
mately considers the strength of the Commonwealth’s case against
the petitioner regarding the underlying criminal allegations versus
the petitioner’s interest in reducing the stigma and harm to the peti-
tioner stemming from a criminal record.93  The court can consider
why the Commonwealth would want to retain the records in light of
the detriment it causes to the petitioner.94  The court may also in-
quire into the petitioner’s age, prior criminal record, and past em-
ployment opportunities as well as the time between the arrest and
the petition to expunge and any specific harsh effects that the peti-
tioner alleges in considering the expungement petition.95
The procedure for a Wexler hearing is fairly simple.  If the
judge orders the expungement of the defendant’s arrest record, the
attorney for the Commonwealth may object to the expungement.96
If the attorney’s objections are timely filed, the judge must hold a
hearing on the objections.97  During this hearing, the burden is on
the Commonwealth to prove that the record should be main-
tained.98  The Commonwealth must convince the judge with speci-
ficity that the defendant is not entitled to an expungement of his or
her arrest record.99
Wexler hearings typically occur in the context of a request for
expungement of a criminal history record containing instances of
non-conviction, such as acquittal or nolle prosequi.100  The Com-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Iacino, 411 A.2d 754, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979)). See also Commonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310, 319 (Pa. 2014)
(“[G]ranting an expungement in this case would neither enhance Appellee’s em-
ployment opportunities nor assist Appellant in casting off the stigma of the
charges, as the rest of Appellee’s arrest record and record of his felony convictions
still exist.”).
94. See Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879 (quoting Iacino, 411 A.2d at 759).
95. Id.
96. PA. R. CRIM. P. 320.
97. See Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879 (quoting Iacino, 411 A.2d at 759).
98. Id.
99. Wexler, 431 A.2d at 881 (“The mere assertion of a general interest in
maintaining accurate records of those accused of crime is not convincing.”).
100. Id. at 880.
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monwealth must then argue that the value of retaining the arrest
record substantially outweighs the benefits of expungement, which
is a significant burden.101  Although criminal record expungement is
typically governed by statutory authority,102 the granting of a Wex-
ler hearing is one of the limited situations in which a defendant may
rely solely on due process protections in order to expunge parts of a
criminal record.103  No similar statutory authority exists in the con-
text of civil record expungement.104
C. Expungement Law in the Civil Realm
The expungement of civil records is governed solely by case
precedent derived from due process protections.105  Temporary pro-
tection orders that never make it to the final hearing phase, due to
acts like voluntary or court ordered withdrawal, can be expunged
from a civil record.106  In P.E.S. v. K.L.,107 plaintiff P.E.S. filed a
Petition for Protection from Abuse against defendant K.L., and the
court denied the plaintiff’s request for a temporary protection or-
der.108  The court scheduled a final hearing for the following week
but neither the plaintiff nor the defendant attended the hearing.109
Even though both parties failed to appear, the court created a re-
cord based on the petition and marked the case as active in the
computer system.110  Four months later, K.L. sought to have the re-
cord of the petition removed from the computer system and filed a
Motion to Dismiss and Expunge the Record.111  K.L. argued that
because the case was designated as “active,” the court record dam-
aged his reputation due to his unique position as a custody evalu-
ator and guardian ad litem.112  The court granted K.L.’s Motion to
Dismiss but refused to grant the Motion to Expunge.113
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the expungement
of a PFA order is appropriate when the petitioner is not granted a
101. Id.
102. § 9122.
103. 103. See Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879.
104. See P.E.S. v. K.L., 720 A.2d 487, 489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
105. See id. at 489–90.
106. Id. at 491.
107. P.E.S. v. K.L., 720 A.2d 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
108. Id. at 488.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.  At the time that this case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, K.L. was the Director of Custody Evaluation Services of Philadelphia, Inc.
Id.
113. Id.
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temporary protection order or when both of the parties fail to ap-
pear at the final hearing and no further action is taken on the peti-
tion.114  The court likened expungement in situations where the
final hearing does not occur to that of an improper or illegal invol-
untary mental health commitment.115  The Pennsylvania Superior
Court found that expungement of K.L.’s record was appropriate
and placed substantial weight on his unique position as a child cus-
tody specialist and the plaintiff’s failure to pursue her abuse peti-
tion.116  A permanent civil record stating that K.L. committed
abuse could have potentially ruined K.L.’s reputation and career,
despite the underlying facts of the petition having never been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.117
If a PFA petitioner is successful in convincing the court at the
ex parte hearing stage that he or she is in immediate danger, then
the court automatically generates a civil record regardless of
whether the underlying allegations have been proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and without giving notice to the PFA de-
fendant.118  The automatic generation of a civil record, combined
with the lack of a statutorily authorized expungement mechanism,
can create a great hardship for a wrongly accused defendant.119
III. ANALYSIS
A. PFA Record Expungement Case Law
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether a consent order is eligible for expungement,120 case law
concerning other issues related to PFA record expungement helps
illuminate how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could potentially
rule on this issue.121  If the PFA proceedings never reach the final
hearing and the court does not issue a final order, then the defen-
114. Id. at 492.
115. See id. at 491 (“[J]ustice demands that appellant be returned to a posi-
tion as near as possible as to that which [he or she] enjoyed prior to the [com-
mencement of the action], namely, an unsullied record.” (quoting Commonwealth
v. J.T., 420 A.2d 1064, 1065–66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980))).
116. See P.E.S., 720 A.2d at 492.
117. Id.
118. See Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The ex parte
hearings conducted in order to secure a temporary PFA Order . . . require only
that the petitioner convince the court he or she is in ‘immediate and present dan-
ger of abuse.’”).
119. Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“A person may
blithely execute a petition inflating claims of abuse.”).
120. 120. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
121. See infra Part III.A.1–3.
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dant can petition the court for expungement of the PFA records.122
Conversely, if the court holds a hearing and enters a final order,
then the PFA records are unavailable for expungement.123  Further,
because consent orders are fully enforceable, the violation of a con-
sent order can result in the same consequences for the defendant as
a violation of a final order entered after a hearing.124
1. Carlacci v. Mazaleski
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carlacci v.
Mazaleski,125 in cases where the petitioner seeks to protect his or
her reputation, a right to petition for expungement of a PFAA re-
cord exists.126  The court remarked that this right is an “adjunct of
due process” and does not depend on express statutory authority.127
Further, the court noted that when the parties in PFAA proceed-
ings discontinue the matter before a final hearing occurs, and when
the parties stipulate that the temporary PFA order should be de-
clared null and void, expungement is warranted.128  Because the
proceedings in Carlacci did not reach the final hearing phase, the
plaintiff never had the opportunity to prove the underlying abuse
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.129  In the view of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the PFAA proceedings did not
“legally evolve[ ]” past the temporary order stage, and, thus, the
maintenance of a civil record was unjustified.130
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likened this situation to that
of a criminal defendant who has been tried and acquitted,131 a situa-
122. See infra text accompanying notes 125–36.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 137–50.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 151–59.
125. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2002).
126. See id. at 190.
127. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 1) (characterizing due process rights by
stating “all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness”).
128. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190–91.
129. Id. at 190.
130. See id. at 191 (quoting Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 757 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999) (Cercone, J., in dissenting memorandum).  President Judge Emeritus
Cercone stated in his dissenting memorandum:
Despite the passage of time, the [PFAA] proceedings never legally
evolved beyond the temporary order stage as the Trial Court merely con-
tinued the original temporary order which was issued ex parte. The Trial
Court did not issue a permanent order or make any . . . findings of fact
that incidents of abuse had occurred.
Id.
131. Id. at 191.
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tion in which expungement is appropriate as a matter of law with-
out the use of the Wexler balancing test.132  Further, the use of the
Wexler balancing test would be “unnecessary and inappropriate”
because the test would effectively assess the strength of the prose-
cution’s case, despite the defendant having already obtained the
verdict of acquittal.133  In order to apply the first factor of the Wex-
ler balancing test in a PFA matter, the trial court would have to
assess the strength of the PFA petition.134  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court found that it was not proper to grant a Wexler hearing
for a PFA petition that had been dismissed by court order before
the plaintiff had an opportunity to prove the underlying allegations
of abuse.135  A Wexler balancing test analysis is therefore unneces-
sary and improper when a court order dismisses the PFA petition or
when the PFAA proceedings never evolve past the temporary order
stage.136
2. Commonwealth v. Charnik
According to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, after a PFA
case reaches the final hearing stage and a final order is entered, the
record of the proceeding may not be expunged.137  In Common-
wealth v. Charnik,138 the defendant sought to expunge a final PFA
order after the plaintiff withdrew the final order.139  The lower
court entered a PFA order after it conducted a full hearing and
found that the plaintiff proved the underlying allegations of abuse
by a preponderance of the evidence.140  The superior court found
this situation to be more analogous to a conviction record than to a
non-conviction record.141
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.  The court stated:
Just as we found it “improper to go behind a verdict of acquittal and
purport to assess the strength of the prosecution’s case” in attempting to
apply the first factor of the Wexler balancing test in a criminal expunge-
ment matter, it is equally improper to assess the strength of a PFAA peti-
tion that has since been dismissed by court order before the plaintiff even
attempted to meet its burden of proving the allegation of abuse contained
in the PFAA petition, in attempting to apply the Wexler balancing test in
a PFAA expungement matter.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. 1997)).
136. Id.
137. Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
138. Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
139. See id. at 1215.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1218 (quoting Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa.
1997) (explaining the difference between conviction records, which can be ex-
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The defendant presented the court with a logical argument for
extending the language of Carlacci to allow for a Wexler balancing
test in cases where a final hearing is held and a final PFA order is
granted but subsequently withdrawn.142  The court was hesitant to
agree.143  The defendant’s argument ultimately failed because, un-
like in the cases of P.E.S. and Carlacci, the lower court completed
the PFA process and afforded the defendant procedural due pro-
cess by conducting the hearing and giving the defendant a chance to
defend against the allegations of abuse.144  In deciding that ex-
pungement was inappropriate in this case, the Superior Court rec-
ognized that certain patterns associated with the filing and trying of
PFA cases existed and that practical considerations play a role in
deciding whether to extend or limit protections granted by the court
to defendants.145
The Pennsylvania Superior Court explained that the expunge-
ment of a PFA record is never appropriate once the matter reaches
the final hearing phase and a final order is granted.146  Relying on
the specific facts of this case, the superior court voiced a lack of
willingness to allow expungement because of limited judicial re-
sources and the practical considerations of expunging a civil record
for a defendant who also has a criminal record that included convic-
punged only in limited circumstances authorized by statute, and non-conviction or
arrest records, for which expungement is left to judicial discretion in the form of a
Wexler hearing, such as in cases of nolle prosequi).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 1120.  Regarding the defendant’s argument, the court stated:
Charnik asks this Court to take the P.E.S. and Carlacci holdings one step
further and find that, like non-conviction records, he is entitled to a Wex-
ler balancing test on the petition to expunge the PFA record. He claims
that this is the “next step” anticipated by Carlacci.  Although we see the
logic in this argument, we decline to extend the language in Carlacci until
our legislature or our Supreme Court directs.
Id.
144. Id. (“Charnik’s argument presumes a constitutional entitlement to seek
expungement, as recognized in Carlacci. Carlacci and P.E.S., however, were based
on records that existed where the PFA process was not completed and therefore
without the safeguards of due process.”).
145. Id. at 1221.  Regarding the psychological nature of PFA cases, the court
stated:
We note, too, that the facts of this case illustrate a typical sequence in an
abusive relationship; the abuse, the remorse, the forgiveness, and the rep-
etition of that cycle.  Absent extraordinary cause, allowing a hearing to
clear a record of abuse after a final order simply because the victim de-
cided to forgive or “withdraw,” would not only draft the judiciary into the
psychological struggle, but would overwhelm its already limited
resources.
Id.
146. Id. at 1220–21.
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tions for indirect criminal contempt.147  Indirect criminal contempt
(ICC) convictions in general are unavailable for expungement un-
less the defendant meets one of the limited statutory categories148
of criminal record expungement.149  Thus, even if expungement had
been an option for the defendant, the court would have likely re-
jected that opportunity because the defendant’s criminal record
would still have contained evidence of the PFA violation despite
the civil record expungement.150
3. Commonwealth v. Nelson
Final PFA orders by consent of the parties without an admis-
sion of the underlying allegations of abuse by the defendant are
both authorized and enforceable under the PFAA.151  The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Nelson152 remarked
that the enforceability of consent orders was an issue of first im-
pression for the court because prior case precedent focused solely
on the enforceability of temporary orders and final orders stem-
ming from a final hearing.153
This case arose out of the context of an ICC proceeding,154 and
the defendant argued that he could not be charged with ICC if the
underlying allegations in the PFA had never been proven.155
Neither the PFAA nor subsequent statutory authority expressly re-
quires that consent agreements must be accompanied by an admis-
147. Id. at 1221.
148. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(b) (2017).
149. Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1217 (“Here, Charnik is less than 70 years of age
and has not been free of arrest or prosecution for ten years.  The trial court’s de-
nial of his petition to expunge the indirect criminal contempt convictions was
proper.” (citing § 9122(b) and Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 749 A.2d 507 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000))).
150. Id. at 1221 (remarking that “it would be inappropriate, as well as fruit-
less, to expunge the PFA record when the criminal record would indicate indirect
criminal contempt convictions stemming from violation of a PFA order”).
151. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super Ct. 1997).
152. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728 (Pa. Super Ct. 1997).
153. See id. at 731.
154. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6114(a) (2017).  The statute states:
Where the police, sheriff or the plaintiff have filed charges of indirect
criminal contempt against a defendant for violation of a protection order
issued under this chapter, a foreign protection order or a court-approved
consent agreement, the court may hold the defendant in indirect criminal
contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with law.
Id.  After the police, sheriff, or the plaintiff file charges of Indirect Criminal Con-
tempt, a hearing to adjudicate the charges is held within ten days. Id. § 6113(f).
155. See Nelson, 690 A.2d at 730.
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sion of abuse.156  The Superior Court looked to a dictionary
definition of “consent” and found that it connotes “acquiescence
without reference to admissions.”157  Therefore, the plain meaning
of the PFAA authorizes consent-based protection orders and ren-
ders them fully enforceable.158  Additionally, PFA orders by con-
sent with no admission of abuse are enforceable because the orders
provide sufficient notice to the defendant of potential criminal con-
sequences for violating the order.159
B. PFA Record Expungement Due Process Analysis
1. PFA Case Precedent Synthesis
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that PFA orders is-
sued by consent without an admission of abuse by the defendant
are fully enforceable because the orders do not violate a defen-
dant’s due process rights.160  Because the holding in Nelson161 spe-
cifically relied on the reasoning that final PFA orders by consent do
not violate a defendant’s due process rights, such orders are likely
not susceptible to expungement on the same reasoning, that the
court afforded adequate due process protections to the defen-
dant.162  A defendant who willingly consents to the entry of a final
PFA order is provided with the opportunity to present a case and
defend against the allegations of abuse but chooses not to do so.163
The defendant effectively waives his or her right to a final hearing
in exchange for a settlement.164
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allows expungement in lim-
ited cases where the lower court does not afford the defendant an
adequate level of due process in order to “protect the reputation of
a person who was unlawfully thrust into the . . . process.”165  A de-
156. See id. at 731 (“[T]he court may grant any protection order or approve
any consent agreement to bring about the cessation of abuse.” (citing § 6108(a))).
157. Id. (citing Consent, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974)).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 730 (stating that “the order provided that any violation of its
terms could lead to the arrest and prosecution of appellee for indirect criminal
contempt”).
160. Id. at 731–32.
161. Id. (holding that PFA orders by consent with no admission of abuse are
fully enforceable).
162. See id. at 732 (finding that defendant was afforded sufficient procedural
due process through notice because “an examination of the consent order demon-
strates that it specifically informed [defendant] that he could be subjected to prose-
cution for indirect criminal contempt upon violating its terms”).
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa. 2002) (citing the reasoning
in Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 253 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1969)) (ap-
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fendant who consents to the entry of a final PFA order likely has
not been “unlawfully thrust” into the process.166  Such a defendant
has entered into an agreement willingly after the court has provided
sufficient notice of the consequences of a final order.167  Unless the
defendant challenges the order by filing a motion for reconsidera-
tion or an appeal, the order is final.168  Once the protection order
becomes final, the order is not subject to collateral attack without
the existence of extraordinary circumstances,169 such as when judi-
cial oversight causes the losing party to be denied knowledge of the
entry of a final judgment.170
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Carlacci based on
whether the lower court afforded the defendant procedural due
process, not on whether a sufficient finding of abuse existed.171  A
defendant who agrees to a PFA order by consent effectively waives
his or her right to a hearing and enters into a final order with the
knowledge that the protection order may have a negative effect on
his or her reputation or lead to criminal consequences in the form
of an ICC charge.172
Thus, such a defendant cannot later argue that the court de-
prived him or her of due process because the consent order pro-
vides the defendant with sufficient notice of the repercussions of
violating the order.173  Therefore, case precedent points to the
proving “of the concept of protecting the reputation of a person who was unlaw-
fully thrust into the criminal process by sanctioning the expungement of his
criminal record”).
166. See id.
167. See Nelson, 690 A.2d at 732.
168. See Luckenbaugh v. Shearer, 523 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
The court stated:
[O]nce a final order or judgment is entered, an appeal must be filed
within thirty days or, the trial court must expressly grant reconsideration
within thirty days. If either of these two events do not occur, the judg-
ment is final and except for “extraordinary cause” is not subject to collat-
eral attack by virtue of a petition to open and/or strike.
Id. See also PA. R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) (“After an appeal is taken or review of a quasi-
judicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may . . . [g]rant
reconsideration of the order which is the subject of the appeal or petition . . . .”).
169. See Luckenbaugh, 523 A.2d at 402.
170. Id. at 401.
171. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190–91.
172. Nelson, 690 A.2d at 732.
173. See id. (stating “an examination of the consent order demonstrates that it
specifically informed appellee that he could be subjected to prosecution for indi-
rect criminal contempt upon violating its terms”).
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likely conclusion that expungement is not available for a final order
that was entered into by consent of the parties.174
2. Public Policy Considerations
The ability to expunge a PFA order entered by consent of the
parties in limited circumstances benefits the interests of the parties
and the judicial system.  If the ultimate purpose of the Protection
from Abuse Act is to stop current abuse, prevent instances of fu-
ture abuse, and protect plaintiffs,175 providing parties with a tool to
settle PFA matters amicably through the expungement of a consent
order is seemingly in harmony with at least one purpose of the
PFAA, to not place “impractical burdens” on the petitioner seeking
a protection order.176
As an indicator that public policy might favor the prohibition
of expungement of consent orders, however, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Carlacci referenced the fact that a prior PFA
docket may be considered by the trial court in subsequent PFA pro-
ceedings as well as custody proceedings.177  A defendant’s history
of abuse can be a crucial component of a petitioner’s PFA case,
especially in instances where the plaintiff must show reasonable
fear of imminent serious bodily harm.178  A record of abuse allows
the court to observe patterns of abuse and act accordingly to pre-
vent future abuse.179  Although, even if a repeat defendant was able
to expunge his or her civil record of a prior consent order, the plain-
tiff in a new PFA proceeding against the same defendant could sim-
174. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191; Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214,
1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Nelson, 690 A.2d at 732.
175. See Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). See also
Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
176. See Weir v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating the
purpose of the PFAA is “to provide spouses, household members, intimate part-
ners and children with immediate temporary protection from abuse”) (citing Sny-
der v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 980–982 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). See also Snyder, 629
A.2d at 982 n.2 (“A requirement that Abuse Petitions delineate for the accused
abuser all the incidents of abuse would place an impracticable burden on the
Petitioner.”).
177. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190 (stating, “another consequence of mainte-
nance of a PFAA docket record is the possibility that it can be considered by a trial
court in any subsequent PFAA proceeding”) (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(a)
(2017)).
178. See Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) (stating, “[i]t is possible for a person to be placed in reasonable fear of immi-
nent bodily injury based on telephone calls, particularly when coupled with the
alleged abuser’s past history of violence”) (citing D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 412
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
179. See Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1221.
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ply testify regarding the past allegations of abuse and the existence
of an expunged consent order.180
In contrast with the creation of a per se rule that grants ex-
pungement in PFA cases that do not evolve past the temporary
stage is the notion of judicial discretion.181  Although a per se rule
helps to relieve some constraint on limited judicial resources, the
rule would effectively take discretion away from judges in PFA
matters.182  According to Justice Newman’s dissent in Carlacci, judi-
cial discretion is an integral part of the expungement process.183
Thus, if the courts were to allow the expungement of consent or-
ders, Justice Newman would likely advocate for the use of a Wexler
hearing to decide expungement instead of an automatic statutory
expungement.184  Both of these options are considered in the fol-
lowing section, in addition to a third option that does not involve
consent orders but provides an alternative for PFA attorneys to ob-
tain protection for PFA victims without creating a civil record,
which is not currently available for expungement.
C. Three Proposed Resolutions
1. Grant Defendant a Wexler Hearing as Part of the Consent
Order
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a
protection order by consent is available for expungement.185  Thus,
until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules on this issue or legisla-
tion changes the current law, parties to PFA matters in Penn-
sylvania should assume that the expungement of consent orders is
unavailable.  The PFA hearing court could, however, consider
granting a Wexler hearing to a defendant who agrees to a consent
order.186  The hearing court would not automatically expunge the
record, but would allow the defendant a chance to explain the cir-
cumstances surrounding the PFA matter.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 212–15.
181. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191–92 (Newman, J., dissenting).
182. See id. (“I do not believe that it serves the interests of the citizens of the
Commonwealth to eliminate the exercise of judicial discretion from the expunge-
ment process.  Therefore, I believe that the balancing test set forth in [Wexler]
should apply in the instant matter.”).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
186. See Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1981).
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Because the parties can enter into the consent order on the day
of the final PFA hearing,187 granting the defendant a Wexler hear-
ing in this limited circumstance would allow the defendant to ex-
plain to the hearing court why expungement of the record may be
appropriate.  Instead of placing the burden on the Commonwealth
to argue for the retention of the records, as in the case of a Wexler
hearing for a criminal expungement matter,188 the defendant could
bear the burden of showing with specificity why the court should
not retain the records.  The hearing judge would then decide
whether expungement is proper based on the testimony of the
defendant.
Even though this Wexler hearing scenario could potentially re-
sult in a favorable outcome for both parties because the court
would authorize a protection order for the plaintiff without requir-
ing the plaintiff to endure a hearing and give the defendant the op-
portunity to explain his or her side for the first time, the court
system may be opposed to this solution for fear that it would drain
already limited judicial resources.189
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carlacci held
that the use of the Wexler balancing test was unnecessary when
PFA proceedings do not progress past the temporary order stage,
the court did not address the merits of granting a Wexler hearing to
the defendant in the case of a final order by consent.190  If the
Carlacci court had granted the defendant a Wexler hearing, the
strength of the plaintiff’s case would have been weighed against the
defendant’s interest in preventing potential harm as a result of the
creation of a PFA record.191
During settlement negotiations of a PFA order by consent, a
plaintiff could ask the court to grant the defendant a Wexler hearing
in exchange for a more favorable consent order, such as an ex-
tended length of time192 for the protection order.193  However, the
187. See PA. R. PHILA. CO. FAMILY DIV. 1901.11(d) (“The signed consent
agreement may be submitted to the Court at the hearing.”).
188. Id. at 882 (“The assertion of a general policy opposing expungement in
all cases is not persuasive.” (citing Commonwealth v. Welford, 420 A.2d 1344, 1345
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980))).
189. See Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1220 n.5 (2007).
190. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191.
191. Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879.
192. The maximum length of time for a protection order is three years.  23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6108(d) (2017).
193. § 6108(a)(10) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve
any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor
children.  The order or agreement may include granting any other appropriate re-
lief sought by the plaintiff.”).
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Pennsylvania Superior Court in Charnik declined to hold that the
defendant was constitutionally entitled to a Wexler hearing.194
Moreover, the court would likely not be persuaded by a plaintiff’s
request for the court to grant the defendant a Wexler hearing be-
cause the Charnik court viewed the granting of protection for the
defendant beyond procedural due process rights with great skepti-
cism.195  Especially considering the scarcity of judicial resources,196
a PFA hearing court would likely be unwilling to allow a PFA plain-
tiff to use the promise of a Wexler hearing as a settlement negotia-
tion tool.
2. Reschedule the Final Hearing to Create a Cooling-Off Period
To both avoid a final order being entered and provide the
plaintiff with the protection sought, the court could allow either the
plaintiff or the defendant to simply ask for a continuance and
reschedule the final hearing date.197  As part of this agreement, the
plaintiff could also request that if no ICC violations occur prior to
the new hearing date, then the plaintiff would automatically volun-
tarily withdraw his or her PFA petition.198  A plaintiff may seek to
avoid a final hearing at all costs, even if the facts of his or her case
weigh heavily in favor of a long-term order.  A plaintiff may simply
wish to have as little contact with the defendant as possible and,
thus, being required to attend a court proceeding in the presence of
the alleged abuser may be too stress-inducing and psychologically
difficult for the plaintiff to endure.199  A plaintiff may feel strongly
that a protection order is necessary, but could be so fearful of the
defendant that the plaintiff would rather withdraw his or her peti-
tion than testify at a hearing.
This continued temporary order strategy may be favorable to a
fearful PFA petitioner because it would artificially extend the PFA
194. See Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1220.
195. Id. (“Because we read our Supreme Court’s decision in Carlacci as ex-
pressly limiting the remedy of expungement of PFA records to those cases where
records exist absent the safeguards of due process . . . we decline to extend the
language until the legislature or our Supreme Court directs.”).
196. Id. at 1220 n.5. (“Like the majority in Carlacci, we too question whether
this would prove to be a proper use of limited judicial resources.”).
197. § 6107(b)(2) (mandating that a temporary order “shall remain in effect
until modified or terminated by the court after notice and hearing”).
198. § 6108(a). See also Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 n.1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (“The court is empowered to grant broad relief to bring about a
cessation of abuse . . . .”).
199. See Michael Alan Goldberg, Fighting through the Fear: DART Helps Do-
mestic Violence Victims Navigate their way through Legal System, THE REPORTER
(April 27, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www.thereporteronline.com/article/RO/20130427/
NEWS01/130429536.
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proceedings yet prevent the proceedings from ever reaching the fi-
nal hearing stage.  Under the PFAA, the temporary order obtained
by the plaintiff would remain in effect up until the date of the final
hearing.200  Thus, the plaintiff would be protected by the temporary
order, and the defendant would have a significant interest in com-
plying with the temporary order for the amount of time between
the continuance request and the final hearing date.
Because the PFA proceedings would technically never reach
the final hearing stage, the defendant would have a right to seek
expungement of his or her civil record201 and the plaintiff could re-
ceive a more favorable protection order.  The only potential down-
side to this strategy would be that the PFA matter remains on the
court docket until the rescheduled final hearing date and a judge
may protest that allowing too many continuances could interfere
with the scheduling of new matters.
The benefit to the plaintiff, however, would likely outweigh the
burden on the court system because this amount of time may prove
to be an effective “cooling-off” period that gives the defendant an
even greater incentive to comply with the terms of the temporary
order and refrain from abusing the plaintiff further.202  This strategy
does not allow for automatic expungement.203  The defendant
would need to file a motion to petition the court for expungement
of his or her civil record after the “cooling-off” period is over,
which acts as a further procedural safeguard.204
3. Amend the PFAA to Allow Expungement of Consent Orders
Case precedent stemming from the synthesis of the holdings in
Carlacci,205 Charnik,206 and Nelson207 prevents a defendant from
seeking expungement of a final order by consent because the defen-
dant was likely afforded adequate procedural due process.  No stat-
utory authority for expungement of any kind exists in the PFAA
200. § 6107(b)(2).
201. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190–91 (Pa. 2002).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 197–98.  If no ICC violations occur
during the “cooling-off” period, then the plaintiff would withdraw the PFA peti-
tion on the date of the rescheduled final hearing. See supra text accompanying
notes 197–98.
203. PA. R. CIV. P. 790(A)(1) (“[E]xcept as provided in Rule 320 and 35 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 780–119, an individual who satisfies the requirements for expunge-
ment may request expungement by filing a petition with the clerk of the courts of
the judicial district in which the charges were disposed.”).
204. Id.
205. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190–91.
206. Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
207. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731–32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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and thus the PFAA would have to be amended to include a statu-
tory expungement provision.
This provision could borrow insight from the limited criminal
statutory expungement provisions,208 specifically those provisions
regarding expungement of summary offenses.209  The amendment
to the PFAA could include language that states:
PFA records may be expunged when an individual who is the
subject of a final order by consent with no admission of abuse
petitions the court for the expungement of the PFA record and
has been free of final protection orders and Indirect Criminal
Contempt (ICC) violations for three years following the execu-
tion of the final order by consent.  Expungement under this para-
graph shall be permitted only for a final order by consent with no
admission of abuse.
Statutorily authorized expungement could provide clarity for a
defendant deciding whether to agree to a final order by consent or
participate in a final hearing.210  If a defendant knew exactly what
steps he or she would need to take in order to expunge his or her
civil record, then the parties may be able to reach a settlement
more amicably and efficiently.
Furthermore, the language as set forth above provides the de-
fendant not only the incentive to comply with the terms of the pre-
sent consent order, but the incentive to avoid conduct that could
lead to the court issuing a new final protection order for three years
after the present consent order expires.  Much like expungement of
a continued temporary order, expungement in this statutory scheme
would not occur automatically and would require the defendant to
file a motion for expungement with the proper court.211
The downside to allowing expungement of a final order by con-
sent stems from the scenario of a repeat defendant.  The court may
consider past instances of abuse when determining reasonable fear
of imminent bodily harm.212  The court may also consider past pro-
tection orders when deciding the merits of a current PFA peti-
tion.213  Evidence of past abuse at the center of a final order by
208. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2017).
209. § 9122(b)(3).
210. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107 (2017).
211. PA. R. CIV. P. 790(A)(1).
212. Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(“Past abusive conduct on the appellant’s part was a crucial inquiry necessary for
entry of a proper order.”).
213. § 6107(a).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 27  9-JUL-18 14:44
2018] PENNSYLVANIA PROTECTION FROM ABUSE ACT 965
consent with no admission of abuse may also be relevant to a
court’s inquiry in subsequent proceedings.214
Therefore, if the court grants expungement of the record of a
consent order and the defendant commits an act of abuse that leads
to the filing of a new PFA petition, the expunged consent agree-
ment would not be available as evidence in the subsequent proceed-
ing.  If the same plaintiff is the most recent victim, however, that
plaintiff could simply testify regarding the past instances of abuse
that led to the original consent order.215  Thus, expungement would
have a negative effect only in the limited scenario in which a new
plaintiff files a PFA petition against a defendant with a previously
expunged civil record.
The benefits of amending the PFAA to include a statutory pro-
vision allowing for expungement of consent orders in limited cir-
cumstances outweigh the detriments because statutory
expungement facilitates amicable settlements, frees up scarce judi-
cial resources,216 and provides a great incentive to the defendant to
comply with the content of the consent order.  All three of these
benefits work toward stopping current abuse and preventing future
abuse for a PFA plaintiff and, thus, statutory expungement coin-
cides with the intended purpose of the PFAA.217
IV. CONCLUSION
PFA record expungement is a significant but frequently disre-
garded tool for settlement negotiations218 because of the lack of
statutory guidelines contained within the PFAA219 and the absence
of Pennsylvania Supreme Court case precedent related specifically
to orders by consent with no admission of abuse.220  The purpose of
the PFAA is to stop current abuse and prevent future abuse.221
Providing parties to a PFA matter the bargaining chip of expunge-
ment as part of settlement negotiations could facilitate an amicable
resolution of the matter.222
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would likely find that con-
sent orders are not available for expungement based on case prece-
214. See Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
215. Id.
216. See Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1220 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007).
217. See Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
218. See Weems, supra note 7, at 4.
219. See supra Part II.A.
220. See supra Part III.B.1.
221. See supra Part II.A.3.
222. See supra Part III.C.3.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 28  9-JUL-18 14:44
966 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:939
dent and the current wording of the PFAA.223  Due to this expected
outcome, the option for a PFA plaintiff to use expungement as lev-
erage during settlement negotiations is currently unavailable.  Al-
though a plaintiff can circumvent this lack of availability by
attempting to use the potential for a Wexler hearing224 or by asking
for a continuance for the temporary order,225 an amendment to the
PFAA to allow for the expungement of consent orders in limited
circumstances226 provides clarity, facilitates amicable settlement,
and best serves the interests of the parties to a PFA matter and the
judicial system.
223. See supra Part III.B.1.
224. See supra Part III.C.1.
225. See supra Part III.C.2.
226. See supra Part III.C.3.
